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NATURAL THEOLOGY AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
Harold Netland

Whereas natural theology traditionally has been understood as an attempt to
demonstrate the truth of Christian theism in light of the critiques of agnosticism or atheism, our increased awareness of religious diversity in the West
presents fresh questions demanding attention. Several ways in which recent
philosophers such as John Hick, William Alston, and Alvin Plantinga have
responded to challenges from religious diversity are explored, with limitations
of their approaches noted. I argue that something like Ninian Smart's "soft
natural theology" or worldview analysis is necessary for an adequate response
to religious diversity today.

Natural theology, understood as the attempt to establish claims about
God's existence and / or nature apart from appeal to special revelation, presupposes significant disagreement over religious beliefs. Thus the agenda
of natural theology, as well as prospects for its success, depends in part
upon the nature of the alternative perspectives to which it is a response.
Whereas until fairly recently the available alternatives to Christian theism
were rather limited (during medieval times, Judaism and Islam; in the
modern era, religious agnosticism or atheism), from the 1960s on the West
has been marked by increased awareness of religious diversity. Our neighborhoods, schools and businesses include Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Sikhs,
Bal,ai's, Mormons, Muslims, Jews, Christians, and New Agers, as well as
atheists. The cultural landscape of North America is being transformed, so
that Diana Eck is only slightly guilty of hyperbole when she states, "The
United States has become the most religiously diverse nation on earth."l In
this essay I will explore some implications of our increased awareness of
religious diversity for philosophy of religion, arguing that, for Christian
thinkers, natural theology in some form can and should playa significant
role in Christian responses to religious diversity.
Natural theology is generally linked to the Christian theological traditions of medieval Europe, culminating in the magisterial system of Thomas
Aquinas in the thirteenth century. For many today natural theology continues to be defined largely in terms of the agenda and methodology of
Aquinas. Scott MacDonald characterizes this tradition, which I will call
classical natural theology, as "a kind of demonstrative science" consisting
of "truths about God which are either (1) self-evident or evident to sense
perception, or (2) derived by deductively valid proofs the (ultimate)
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premises of which are self-evident or evident to sense perception."2 Even a
cursory survey of the philosophy of religion in the West from the thirteenth through the early nineteenth centuries indicates the enormous
attraction of this vision of conclusive, demonstrative theistic arguments.
But we should not restrict natural theology to the search for such
demonstrative theistic arguments. In the early modem period, for example,
John Locke, Joseph Butler and William Paley advanced inductive and
probabilistic arguments for Christian theism. Thus, Eugene Long observes
that "natural theology is also used in a broader and more inclusive sense to
refer to all natural knowledge of God arrived at without appeal to the
authority of revelation and faith as manifested in a particular community
of faith."3 Whether understood in the classical deductive sense or more
broadly, MacDonald correctly notes that natural theology "is justificatory
in nature; that is, it is concerned with establishing the truth of certain theological propositions using standard techniques of reasoning starting from
propositions that have some appropriate degree of epistemic justification."·
With the numbers of religious agnostics and atheists increasing during the
seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, the disagreements which natural theology was called upon to resolve were those between Christian theism and increasingly influential forms of non-religious naturalism. Since
the question of God's existence was at the heart of the debate, special attention was given to theistic arguments.
But the intellectual currents of modernity have not been kind to
Christian theism. By the mid-nineteenth century it was widely accepted, by
Christians and non-Christians alike, that Christian belief is irrational unless
such belief could be shown to be justified. Moreover, in some intellectual
circles the assumption that classical natural theology had been thoroughly
discredited by David Hume and Immanuel Kant became virtually
axiomatic. Writing in 1961, for example, Ninian Smart stated, "Natural theology is the Sick Man of Europe. In view of the subtle and exhaustive
objections adduced by Hume, Kant and modem empiricists against the traditional arguments for God's existence, it is no longer reasonable to rely
upon these particular supports for theistic belief."s
In one of the great ironies of modem intellectual history, however, by
the 1970s and 80s there was a remarkable resurgence of interest in natural
theology - including theistic arguments. And yet by the late twentieth
century the intellectual and cultural contexts in the West had changed considerably, so that traditional questions were being addressed in fresh ways
and new issues were demanding attention. Three changes are especially
significant. First, there was a clear move away from earlier attempts to
demonstrate conclusively the truth of Christian theism to the more modest
agenda of showing that it can be reasonable for the Christian in appropriate circumstances to hold Christian beliefs.6 In part, this reflects a shift
away from metaphysics (does God exist?) to epistemology (under what circumstances can it be reasonable for one to believe that God exists?). It is
also indicative of the more modest expectations today in religious epistemology. Second, there was a move away from relying upon deductive theistic arguments in favor of an appeal to religious experience as providing
the grounds for the rationality of Christian belief. Both of these changes
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were responses to the increasingly vigorous critique of religious belief from
agnostic or atheist skeptics, and they signal a departure from the methodology and expectations of classical natural theology.
Third, whereas in the past the major intellectual rivals to Christian theism were regarded as religious agnosticism and atheism, more recently
there has been recognition that increased awareness of religious diversity
itself poses significant questions for Christian claims. No longer are the
options merely Christian theism and atheistic naturalism. The question is
not simply whether to adopt a religious framework but which religious perspective to accept. Peter Berger takes us to the heart of the challenge from
religious diversity when he states, "We do have a problem of belief, and it
not only raises the question of why we should believe in God but why we
should believe in this God. There are others, after all, and today they are
made available in an unprecedented way through the religious supermarket of modem pluralism."7
Religious diversity stems from fundamental disagreement over the
nature of the cosmos, the religious ultimate, the human predicament and
how this predicament might be overcome. Each of the major religious traditions understands itself as having the correct answer to these questions.
Which, if any, is right? Or are all to be rejected? It seems clear that awareness of religious diversity does, for many people, reduce epistemic confidence in the beliefs of their own tradition. Should it do so? What are the
epistemic implications of deeply rooted religious disagreement?' These are
not merely academic questions. Ordinary people regularly evaluate alternative perspectives and make choices. Baptists become Buddhists; atheists
convert to Baha'i; Hindus become Roman Catholics; and Mormons tum
into agnostics. A basic issue for religious epistemology, then, is the basis
upon which one should choose among competing claims to religious truth.
From the perspective of Christian theism, a viable religious epistemology
should provide guidance in answering the question, Why should one be a
Christian instead of accepting one of the many other religious and non-religious
alternatives?
Given the above, we might expect Christian philosophers today to
devote considerable attention to this question. But this is not the case, and
undoubtedly one reason for this is the much lower degree of confidence
many philosophers today have in the capacity of rational reflection to settle
fundamental disputes between worldviews. Many - Christian and nonChristian alike - would embrace what can be called the epistemic parity
thesis. This is the view that evidential and rational considerations relevant
to religious belief are such that no particular religious tradition can be said
to be rationally superior to others; the data are sufficiently ambiguous that
the major religions enjoy more or less epistemic parity. In his important
work Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity, Robert McKim articulates
the thesis in terms of religious ambiguity:
To say that the world is religiously ambiguous is to say that it is open
to being read in various ways, both religious and secular, by intelligent, honest people .... The presence of disagreement suggests that the
matters about which there is disagreement are ambiguous. In partic-
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ular, disagreement in the area of religion suggests that this is an area
in which the available evidence does not point clearly in one direction rather than another, and it suggests that the matters about which
religions purport to speak are matters about which it is unclear what
we ought to believe. 9
McKim claims that in light of such ambiguity we ought to adopt a moderate skepticism and tentativeness in our beliefs. "It is unlikely that certainty about the details of the doctrine of any particular religion about God is
either obligatory or appropriate, and it is likely that tentative belief, at
most, is appropriate." An appropriately tentative approach "will view different accounts of the nature or purposes of God, especially the details of
those accounts, as equally likely to be true, as stabs in the right direction of
something about which it is difficult to be certain. The implication is that
theists ought to be skeptical of many of the claims about God that are made
by the dominant theistic traditions, including their own."lO Whether such
tepid commitment can be religiously satisfying is at least debatable.
Moreover, it is far from obvious that the epistemic parity thesis is the best
way to understand implications of religious diversity and disagreement.
II

The epistemic implications of awareness of religious diversity have been
understood in various ways, which in tum prompt quite different responses. I will note four possible perspectives, mentioning the first briefly and
then giving greater attention to the other three. My concern throughout is
with each perspective's capacity to answer the question why one should
accept Christian claims rather than other religious alternatives, and the
place of natural theology within each perspective in addressing this question. I will argue that while the recent emphasis upon the rationality of
Christian belief, as distinct from the truth of Christian claims, and the
attempt to ground such rationality of belief in religious experiences can be
effective in responding to certain critiques, they are less helpful in dealing
with the challenges from religious diversity. For this, some form of natural
theology is necessary.
One possible response to religious diversity is skepticism about all religious claims. Religious disagreement, it is said, undermines the claims of
any single religion to distinctive truth, and provides positive reasons for
rejecting the claims of any particular religion as well as the claims of all
religions collectively. Given deeply embedded incompatibilities in truth
claims among religions, and the absence of any clear procedure for adjudicating such conflicting claims satisfactorily, the wisest course surely is to
dismiss all such claims as false or, at best, to withhold judgment concerning their truth or falsity.
This is an important perspective which deserves a much more comprehensive response than can be provided here. A few brief comments will
have to suffice. An adequate response to such skepticism would involve
demonstrating that religious disagreement by itself does not demand rejection of the claims of any particular religion nor even a general suspension
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of judgment. Moreover, the skeptical response is often supported by
appeal to the epistemic parity thesis, so that, it is said, no single religious
tradition is in a rationally privileged position. Thus, an adequate response
should also involve showing the inadequacy of the epistemic parity thesis,
something that the fourth option to be considered below attempts to do.
Religious pluralism is another possible response to awareness of religious diversity. Pluralism holds that it is unreasonable to reject the claims
of all of the major religions as simply false; we should assume that despite
clear differences among them the major religions can be said to be "in
touch" with the same ultimate reality, thus providing equally legitimate
religious alternatives. Religious pluralism is thus said to be rationally
preferable to either philosophical naturalism, which dismisses all religious
claims as unjustified, or any form of religious particularism, which maintains that it alone is rationally superior to other religious traditions. John
Hick, the most influential advocate of religious pluralism in recent years,
adopts a kind of natural theology to defend two theses: (1) It can be rational for persons in appropriate circumstances to adopt a religious interpretation of the universe rather than a naturalistic interpretation; and (2) The
skeptical response to awareness of religious disagreement can be mitigated
only if we adopt a pluralistic understanding of the religions as the best
explanation for the similarities and differences across religious traditionsY
Hick's writings over the years both exemplify and have helped to influence the shift away from demonstrative theistic arguments to the rationality of religious belief, as well as the attempt to ground such rationality in
religious experience. For example, already in Faith and Knowledge (1957)
Hick rejected the agenda of classical natural theology and acknowledged
that the traditional theistic arguments are either clearly unsound or at best
inconclusive. Rather than try to demonstrate the truth of Christian theism,
he argued that it could be entirely reasonable or rational for a Christian in
appropriate circumstances to believe in God, and that the rationality of
Christian belief is grounded in what Christians take to be experiences of
the presence and activity of God.
We become conscious of the existence of other objects in the universe,
whether things or persons, either by experiencing them for ourselves
or by inferring their existence from evidences within our experience.
The awareness of God reported by the ordinary religious believer is
of the former kind. He professes, not to have inferred that there is a
God, but that God as a living being has entered into his own experience. He claims to enjoy something which he describes as an experience of God. I '
Thirty years later, Hick expressed the principle as follows: "It is as reasonable for those who experience their lives as being lived in the presence of
God, to believe in the reality of God, as for all of us to form beliefs about
our environment on the basis of our experience of it."13
In Faith and Knowledge Hick also introduced the notions of "experiencing-as", or the inherently interpretive nature of all experience, and the religiously ambiguous nature of the world. Both themes have been influential
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in subsequent philosophy of religion and are integral to his later model of
religious pluralism. Hick distinguished three dimensions of reality implicit in our experiences - the natural or physical, the human and ethical, and
the divine or religious realms. On each level there is an irreducible element
of interpretation in our experience, with the greatest degree of epistemological ambiguity on the religious dimension. Given such ambiguity, the
determinative factor in rational assessment is the nahlre of one's own experience. The person who experiences God interprets the totality of life theistically; the one who fails to experience God interprets life naturalistically.
Either response can be rational, depending upon's one's particular circumstances and experiences.
Interestingly, although Faith and Knowledge was written in an attempt to
defend the reasonableness of Christian belief against atheistic critiques in
the 1950s, several decades later Hick had abandoned Christian orthodoxy
and was an apologist for religious pluralism. But in spite of the theological
changes, his basic epistemological framework remained intact. What
became apparent in his later work, however, is that some of the earlier
epistemological assumptions which were so effective in defending
Christian belief against attacks from atheism can also be used, when modified slightly, to argue in a more general way for the rationality of nonChristian religious beliefs on the basis of religious experiences within other
religious traditions. This was recognized by Hick as early as 1971, in

Arguments for the Existence of God.
The principle which I have used to justify as rational the faith of a
Christian who on the basis of his own religious experience cannot
help but believing in the reality of "the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ", also operates to justify as rational the faith of a Muslim
who on the basis of his religious experience cannot help believing in
the reality of Allah and his providence; and the faith of the Buddhist
who on the basis of his religious experience cannot help accepting the
Buddhist picture of the universe; and so on.14
Thus, although Hick's appeal to a rather modest notion of rationality and
the centrality of religious experience in justifying Christian belief was effective in deflecting the challenge from atheism, it did so by allowing in principle for the rationality of adherents of other religions in holding their
respective beliefs. While it provides for the justification of a Christian
believing as she does, it does not give positive reasons for someone else
who does not already interpret the world "Christianly" - a Buddhist or
atheist - to accept Christian claims as true. The later Hick, of course,
rejects the idea that Christian theism can be shown to be distinctively true
in favor of a model of religious pluralism which sees the major religions as
roughly equally legitimate responses to the divine reality, the Real.
Natural theology can play two quite different roles with respect to
Hick's model of religious pluralism. Hick uses a kind of natural theology
to support his model as the preferred alternative to both a reductionistic
naturalism and various forms of religious particularism. On the other
hand, critics of religious pluralism can also appeal to natural theology to
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argue against Hick's model, pointing out problems with Hick's thesis and
providing reasons for regarding orthodox Christian claims, for example, as
distinctively true. As an explanatory model for religious diversity, Hick's
proposal must be evaluated in terms of internal consistency and its capacity to account for phenomena of actual religious traditions, and I have
argued elsewhere that, in spite of its undeniable appeal, it is fatally flawed
on both countsY
The third response to religious diversity maintains that although it is
not possible for any single religion (including Christianity) to be shown to
be rationally preferable to other religious and non-religious alternatives, it
can be reasonable for a Christian in appropriate circumstances to believe
that Christianity is distinctively true and efficacious. This perspective,
embraced by many Christian thinkers, has the merits of combining epistemic modesty with recognition of the epistemic propriety (in some sense)
of Christian beliefs. William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga have been
especially significant in developing this response.
Perhaps the most influential recent attempt to ground the rationality of
religious belief in religious experience is William P. Alston's Perceiving
GOd 16 • Alston examines "doxastic practices", or belief forming practices
which give rise to beliefs. His argument rests upon a crucial analogy
between practices relying upon sense perception which provide access to
the physical world around us, resulting in beliefs about the physical world,
and religious practices, which provide the believer with experiences or
"perceptions" of God, thereby producing beliefs about God. In both sense
perception and perception of God beliefs are formed by engaging in certain
"doxastic practices", or socially established practices resulting in formation
of appropriate beliefs. In neither case is it possible to justify the reliability
of the doxastic practices in a strictly non-circular manner. Yet in both cases
we have established procedures for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate beliefs. Thus, he argues, beliefs formed through the relevant doxastic practices can be granted prima facie justification, and if there are no
sufficient "overriders" (factors which would rebut or undermine the
beliefs) then they can be considered "unqualifiedly justified" as well. So
the Christian can be rationally justified in believing in God based upon his
experience or perception of God.
Now, as Alston himself recognizes, religious diversity presents a twofold challenge to his thesis. First, while Alston's argument supports the
rationality of Christian beliefs, based upon Christian experiences of God, it
also in principle supports the rationality of the beliefs of practitioners of
other religions, based upon their respective religious experiences. At best,
then, Alston's argument supports a weaker notion of rationality of religious
belief, such that divergent religious communities all can be rational in holding their respective beliefs, even if these beliefs are in fact mutually incompatible. But, more significantly, religious diversity itself actually seems to
undermine Alston's thesis about the general reliability of religious doxastic
practices for religious belief formation. Here the differences between sense
perception and religious perception are important. While the doxastic practices for sense perception produce similar beliefs about the external world
among diverse peoples (water is wet for Buddhists and Christians alike),
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the doxastic practices of different religious communities result in strikingly
different, even incompatible, beliefs. Thus, religious diversity seems to call
into question the reliability of any single doxastic practice, including that of
the Christian community. For even if one form of practice is uniquely reliable in religious belief formation, we have no non-question-begging way of
determining which one that is. While acknowledging the force of this objection, however, Alston concludes that it still can be rational for the Christian
to "sit tight with the practice of which I am a master and which serves me
so well in guiding my activity in the world" and to continue to hold
Christian beliefs on the basis of experiences of God.!7
In responding to Alston, however, Hick argues that if a Christian is justified in this manner in believing that Christianity is uniquely true then it
follows that the Christian should conclude that most of the beliefs of
adherents of other religions, based upon their respective experiences, are
actually false. But if so, then it also follows that most of the religious beliefs
based upon religious experience worldwide are in fact false. And thus, for
one particular religious community to assume that its doxastic practices are
reliable and that their beliefs are justified, when those of the other religious
communities are not, is simply arbitrary unless this assumption can be justified on independent grounds.!' In an incisive assessment of Alston's thesis, William Wainwright similarly concludes that if the rationality of
Christian beliefs is to be established then the acceptability of Christian doxastic practices for Christian belief formation will need to be supported by
"introducing empirical and metaphysical arguments that establish the
superiority of (e.g.) the Christian worldview" - a task normally associated
with natural theology.!9 Significantly, Alston is open to some role for natural theology in establishing the epistemic superiority, to some degree, of
Christian theism to other alternatives, although he does not develop this
possibility. Toward the end of Perceiving God, he states that "the attempt
to argue from neutral starting points for the truth of Christian beliefs
deserves much more serious consideration than is commonly accorded it
today in philosophical and (liberal) theological circles. I believe that much
can be done to support a theistic metaphysics, and that something can be
done by way of recommending the 'evidences of Christianity'.2o
Alvin Plantinga has also addressed the issue of religious diversity from
the perspective of Reformed epistemology. Plantinga has provided a trenchant critique of "classical evidentialism", which is said to provide the epistemological framework within which both classical natural theology and its
critics operated. Contrary to earlier assumptions, Plantinga claims that
there is no need for the Christian believer to demonstrate the truth of
Christian theism, or even to provide "sufficient reasons" for Christian faith.
As Plantinga famously put it, it can be "entirely right, rational, reasonable,
and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argument at all."2!
For the Christian in appropriate circumstances, belief in God can be "properly basic" and thus ~e epistemically appropriate apart from any appeal to
supporting evidence. More recently, Plantinga has argued that Christian
beliefs can be warranted, where warrant is understood as that which, when
combined with true belief, results in knowledge. Warrant is connected with
proper function, so that" a belief has warrant just if it is produced by cogni-
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tive processes or faculties that are functioning properly, in a cognitive environment that is propitious for the exercise of cognitive powers, according to
a design plan that is successfully aimed at the production of true belief."23
With respect to the challenge of religious diversity, Plantinga maintains
that even when confronted by radical religious disagreement the Christian
exclusivist need not defend his beliefs by appealing to reasons for accepting Christian claims rather than embracing religious skepticism or the
beliefs of another tradition.24 There is no need for the Christian to engage
in natural theology in order to show that Christian belief is rational.25 But
this position, whatever its merits on other grounds, provides little help in
resolving the question raised earlier, Why should one be a Christian rather
than a follower of another religious tradition?
Let us assume that Plantinga is correct in saying that it can be entirely
reasonable for belief in God to be properly basic in appropriate circumstances. Philip Quinn, among others, notes that this move comes with a
price, for "this is a game any number can play. Followers of Muhammed,
followers of Buddha, and even followers of the Reverend Moon can join
the fun."26 Quinn's point is an important one. It is difficult to see why
belief in God can be properly basic for Christians but fundamental beliefs
of other religions cannot also be properly basic for their adherents. 27 For
example, the central insights of Zen Buddhism - including the belief that
ultimate reality is sunyata, or emptiness - are said to be perceived directly
in the experience of satori or enlightenment. They are not the product of
rational argument, indeed evidence and argument are counter-productive
in attaining enlightenment. Moreover, the experience of sa tori grounds the
relevant claims. Thus, belief in emptiness as the ultimate reality is a basic
belief for Zen Buddhists. Is it also properly basic for Buddhists? Nothing
that I have seen shows why this could not be the case.
Nor will it help matters to appeal to Plantinga's discussion of proper
function at this point, for the dispute then simply shifts to the question of
what constitutes proper function. Many Buddhists, for example, maintain
that belief in a personal creator God is both false and the product of malfunctioning cognitive faculties. The dispute, then, between the Christian
and Buddhist is not merely a disagreement over what beliefs can be properly basic. It also concerns what constitutes proper function of the cognitive
faculties, and settling that question requires determining the truth value of
some of the central metaphysical claims of the Christian or Buddhist traditions. Why should one be a Christian rather than a Buddhist? In spite of its
strengths in other respects, Plantinga's discussion of proper basicality, proper function and warrant provides little guidance in determining whether
Christian theism is true or rationally preferable to other altematives.2S
The move away from the agenda of classical natural theology to the
attempt to establish the rationality of Christian belief based upon the experiences of Christians, while significant in some respects, is inconclusive. It
can provide an effective response to some critiques of Christian theism
from philosophical naturalism, and the arguments of Hick, Alston and
Plantinga do support the rationality of holding Christian beliefs in appropriate circumstances. However, as we have seen, this involves a rather
weak notion of rationality which cannot rule out the rationality of others -
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non-religious naturalists as well as adherents of other religions - also
holding beliefs incompatible with Christian theism. Moreover, it provides
no reason for the secularist, who does not have religious experiences, to
embrace any particular religion. Thus, what is required is an approach to
religious diversity which takes us beyond appeal merely to religious experience and reliance upon a weaker notion of rationality, and for this some
form of natural theology is inescapable.
III
A fourth response to religious diversity maintains that it is possible to
show, in some sense, that Christian theism is rationally preferable to other
religious and non-religious alternatives. Those advocating this option
reject a strong notion of religious ambiguity. At the same time that John
Hick wrote Faith and Knowledge, Ninian Smart, an acknowledged authority
on Hindu and Buddhist thought as well as a Christian analytic philosopher, challenged Christians to address the question, "Why be a Christian
rather than a Buddhist?"29 In the same 1961 essay in which he referred to
natural theology as the "Sick Man of Europe", Smart also argued:
Any appeal to religious experience (whether intuitive or otherwise)
must inevitably lead to a consideration of the experience not merely
of Christians but of Buddhists and others, and thereby to an examination of the way experience is linked to different sorts of doctrines.
Through this investigation one is bound to ask what the criteria are
for choosing between different formulations of religious belief. And
from the apologetic point of view it is necessary to give reasons for
accepting one's own faith rather than some other.30
While rejecting the methodology and expectations of classical natural
theology, Smart advocated a fresh kind of natural theology that takes seriously the issues of competing truth claims across religions. Smart understood religions as complex, multi-dimensional phenomena, with each religious tradition manifesting a particular worldview or set of core beliefs in
terms of which it interprets humanity, the cosmos, and the religious ultimate. Worldviews make explicit or implicit claims about the way things
are, or should be, and Smart called for "worldview analysis", by which he
meant both the analysis of the ways beliefs function internally within a system as well as the relation between core beliefs of diverse worldviews.
Smart contended that such analysis was incomplete unless it included
assessment of the truth or rationality of different worldviews, and thus a
primary task for "cross-cultural philosophy of religion" is "to clarify the
criteria for determining the truth as between worldviews".31
Smart spoke of this project as "soft natural theology", and although in
later years he became increasingly preoccupied with the phenomenology
of comparative religion, up until his death he continued to call for a
responsible form of worldview analysis. In speaking of "soft" natural theology Smart distinguished his proposal from classical natural theology.
While recognizing that there are some non-arbitrary criteria that can be
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applied in evaluating worldviews, and that there may be good reasons for
accepting Christian theism as opposed to other religious alternatives,
Smart did not think that we have demonstrative knock-down arguments
which resolve the issues conclusively. A degree of ambiguity and uncertainty is unavoidable. So even as he called for a soft natural theology in the
context of religious diversity, Smart was fairly modest in his expectations
for this enterprise.
There are, of course, degrees of softness. While Smart correctly recognized that with respect to religious diversity natural theology is not likely to
be conclusive, he was perhaps excessively modest in his expectations for
what can be accomplished through world view analysis. To be sure, the
complexity of the issues should not be minimized. But, contrary to the epistemic parity thesis, is it really the case that the proposition "God exists" has
no greater evidential or rational support than its denial? Or is it really true
that the central claims of Theravada Buddhism or Jainism have the same
degree of rational support as those of orthodox Christianity? I think not.
Undoubtedly one of the most impressive recent attempts at natural theology is the sustained probabilistic argument of Richard Swinburne. Over
the course of seven books, Swinburne argues for the coherence and plausibility of orthodox Christian theism. 32 After rich and rigorous discussion
(and repeated application of Bayes Theorem) Swinburne concludes that
"on our total evidence theism is more probable than not."33 If Swinburne is
correct tl,en strong views on religious ambiguity will need to be modified
and there would be strong reasons for preferring Christian theism to its
denial.
But Swinburne constructs his argument in reference to two options Christian theism and its denial, atheism. As we have noted, however,
there are many religious alternatives to Christian theism, and J. L.
Schellenberg correctly points out that Swinburne has conducted his
lengthy argument with almost no reference to the plausibility of other religious worldviews, nor does he include in his calculation of probabilities
the impact of awareness of religious diversity. Schellenberg contends that
Swinburne must show that Christian theism is "more probable than all other
contenders".34 Swinburne, in tum, rejects Schellenberg's claim.
I do not need to make a detailed investigation [of all other religions]
if I can show that none of those religions even claim for themselves
characteristics to be expected a priori of a true religion and claimed
by Christianity, and that there is enough evidence that Christianity
does have these characteristics. For then I will be in a position to
argue that there are reasons adequate to show that the Christian religion is more likely to be true than they are. 3'
While Swinburne cannot be expected to investigate the claims of every other
religion, surely the phenomena of the major religious traditions - particular
experiences and metaphysical claims in Buddhism and Hinduism, for example - are relevant to the calculation of the overall probability of Christian theism. But it is far from clear how such factors should be assessed within the
Bayesian probabilistic framework of Swinburne's argument.
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Alternatively, soft natural theology in the context of religious diversity
might focus upon the epistemic credentials of a few particular beliefs central to certain religious worldviews. To take an obvious example, if it can
be established that God, as understood within theism, exists, this provides
strong reasons for rejecting the claims of religions such as Theravada
Buddhism, which are generally regarded as incompatible with theism.
While classical theistic arguments should continue to be explored, in light
of the perhaps impossibly high expectations that accompany deductive
arguments, and the lack of consensus after centuries of debate, this is probably not the most fruitful approach. 36 More promising might be the cumulative case, or inference to the best explanation, argument, which maintains
that a strong case for the truth of Christian theism can be established
through the careful accumulation and analysis of a wide variety of data
from various dimensions of our experience and the world. 37 While none of
the phenomena, either individually or collectively, entail the truth of
Christian theism, the argument claims that Christian theism provides a
more plausible explanation for the data than other alternatives. There is of
course an inescapable measure of personal judgment in such arguments,
but this does not mean that such judgments are necessarily arbitrary. As
William Abraham puts it, "Personal judgment simply means the ability to
weigh evidence without using some sort of formal calculus."38
Soft natural theology can also proceed through critique of particular
claims made by other perspectives. We might consider the epistemology
of religious experience and claims based upon certain kinds of introspective experiences, and in so doing challenge the epistemic parity thesis. Is it
really the case that it is just as rational to accept as veridical purported
experiences of Nirguna Brahman among Hindus or of Emptiness among
Buddhists as it is to accept purported experiences of the personal God of
Christian theism? Keith Yandell, among others, has persuasively argued
that certain introspective enlightenment experiences at the heart of Advaita
Vedanta Hinduism and Buddhism cannot be veridical. 3Y If he is correct, this
has significant implications for religious claims based upon such experiences. Similarly, if the notion of anattta (no self) in classical Buddhism is
indeed incoherent, as many argue, then this provides positive reason for
rejecting a central tenet of many Buddhist traditions. 40 And so on.
Soft natural theology should be appropriately modest in expectations.
There is no reason to expect that an appropriate natural theology in contexts of religious diversity requires a simple algorithmic procedure for testing worldviews or even that it should seek a conclusive deductive argument for theism. Nor should we suppose that all reasonable persons, when
presented with the relevant evidence and arguments, will be readily convinced. Few issues of any real significance meet these expectations.
Nevertheless, the claim that worldview analysis can result in identifying
good reasons for preferring Christian theism to other alternatives seems
eminently reasonable.
That rational considerations of this sort can be significant in a person's
abandoning a non-Christian worldview and embracing Christian theism is
illustrated in the recent conversion of Paul Williams from Buddhism to
Roman Catholicism. Williams, Professor of Indian and Tibetan Philosophy
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and Head of the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at the
University of Bristol, was for twenty years a practicing Buddhist and is a
widely published scholar of Buddhism. But he recently converted to
Roman Catholicism, and he has shared his spiritual and intellectual journey in the remarkable book The Unexpected Way: On Converting From
Buddhism to Catholicism:! Among the factors involved in his eventual rejection of Buddhism were his growing intellectual dissatisfaction with some
central Buddhist metaphysical and epistemological claims, including the
inability of Buddhism to account for the contingency of the universe. It
was Buddhism's failure to address satisfactorily the question "Why is there
something instead of nothing?" which prompted Williams to look again at
theism. As he puts it, "I have come to believe that there is a gap in the
Buddhist explanation of things which for me can only be filled by God, the
sort of God spoken of in a Christian tradition such as that of St. Thomas
Aquinas." Williams is worth quoting at length on this point:
Why is there something rather than nothing? Why is there anything at all? And why is there a world in which, among other things,
the processes (causation, etc.) detected by the Buddha are the case?
Why is it that this way of things is the way of things? As the Buddhist
scriptures (sutras) have it: "Whether Buddhas occur or do not occur,
the true way of things (Sanskrit: dharmata) remains." Why? Why is it
like that? The dharmata is not what we call "necessarily existent". That
is, there is no logical contradiction in a world in which things are not
like that.... Thus the dharmata, the true way of things, is contingent. It
could have been otherwise .... We have a contingent fact or state of
affairs, how things happen to be in the actual world, for which we are
entitled to ask the reason....
Any answer to that question - if there is one - would have to be
a necessary being, a being about which it would make no sense to ask
the question why that exists rather than not. For the theist God is the
answer to this question, and God is needed as the ultimate explanation for existence at any time, keeping things in whatever existence
things have.
I think I have to agree with the theist.
For me the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" has become a bit like what Zen Buddhists call a koan. It is a constant niggling question that has worried and goaded me (often, I
think, against my will) into a different level of understanding, a different vision, of the world and our place in it:'
In teasing out the implications of contingency - in turning Leibniz's
question into a Zen koan - Williams captures nicely what is at the heart of
classical cosmological arguments and applies it effectively in worldview
analysis, in this case, analysis of Buddhist metaphysics. Here is a creative
and promising suggestion for soft natural theology with respect to religious diversity. The analogy to a Zen koan is intriguing, for just as the koan
is used in Zen to prompt one to see reality from a radically new perspective, so too soft natural theology in worldview analysis ought to stimulate
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reconsideration of basic ontological assumptions, prodding one to the recognize the plausibility of Christian theism.
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